A fatal electrical tragedy took the life of a man who worked for a landscaping company and, while a state regulatory agency said the utility could not have prevented the 2025 accident, it also identified “mistakes and poor performance” found in the company’s response, a new report shows.
The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority performed the investigation into the death of Luis Alberto Morocho Marcatoma, who was killed as he left Yale Golf Course after he reportedly grabbed a power line that had fallen, Dan Coughlin, assistant chief of the New Haven Fire Department said at the time.
The PURA decision also notes that the incident, which happened between 5 and 6 p.m. on Aug. 21, 2025, occurred when “Marcatoma was accidentally and fatally electrocuted by a fallen primary wire at 200 Conrad Drive, New Haven.”
The agency ruling was adopted by PURA commissioners Thomas H. Wiehl, David Arconti, Jr., Janice A. Beecher, and Holly H. Cheeseman.
The PURA report states that the authority “outlines the gaps in UI’s response” and “recommends that (United Illuminating) address the mistakes made by its responders. To make necessary process improvements, it is imperative that UI review its actions post event, identifying ways to prevent such mistakes before they occur, and to raise the issue with personnel following the incident so that individual employees will be more vigilant in future events.”
“Based on the record of causes, facts, and circumstances of the incident, the Authority does not find evidence that (United Illuminating) failed to take any actions that would have prevented the accident itself,” the report states.
”However, the investigation identified shortcomings in the Company’s response that must be addressed by UI to ensure the Company properly responds to future incidents and fulfills its responsibility to care for public safety. “
UI spokesperson Sarah Wall Fliotsos, when asked by The Courant for the company’s response to the report, said, “Today PURA issued its findings regarding the tragic incident on the Yale Golf Course back in August. Our thoughts and deepest sympathies remain with those impacted by this accident.”
Marcatoma worked for Eastern Land Management, a contractor that provides landscaping services for the Yale Golf Course, the PURA ruling says, and several witnesses observed that he grabbed a primary electrical wire at the time of the incident.
In its analysis, PURA found that, on the day of the accident, a tree took down two of three primary electrical phase wires at the driveway entrance to the Yale Golf Course.
Though the golf course superintendent told the workers not to try to leave until the tree and power lines were moved, “Marcatoma and other employees were observed exiting their vehicles and approaching the fallen tree, trying to figure out if they could move it out of their way” the PURA report says.
“Eight out of 10 witnesses of the incident reported they observed Mr. Marcatoma moving tree branches and then grabbing a power line with both of his hands,” the report states,
An email seeking comment was sent to Eastern Land Management.
PURA also noted that there were three primary distribution cables, each protected by a circuit breaker that cuts power to the line if it should fall, and that two of the circuit breakers activated and cut power to two of the primary cables but the third line “was damaged and pulled low, but did not touch the ground” and the circuit breaker “for this cable did not activate and therefore it remained energized.” It was the cable Marcatoma grabbed, the report states,
PURA said UI was notified at about 4:44 p.m. of the power outage.
About what occurs when an outage is reported, PURA wrote that, in general, when an electrical outage is identified by UI’s Outage Management System, or OMS, the UI Energy Control Center, or ECC, checks additional meters fed off the outage location to confirm the outage, and after one is confirmed, the ECC assigns a line restoration leader, or LRL to the location, who then assesses the situation, makes it safe, addresses the outage, and reports back to the ECC, according to the report.
The 9th hole at the Yale Golf Course.
In this case, the ECC assigned an LRL to the outage at 4:56 p.m. and that person left from 100 Marsh Hill Road in Orange at 5:01 p.m. with the destination approximately 21 minutes away, but after about a mile en route, the person realized they did not have the proper personal protective equipment in their vehicle and returned to the building to obtain it, according to the report. The person then departed a second time at 5:25 p.m. and was “the only line resource available to respond; all other crews were conducting scheduled outages.”
As the person drove to the site, UI received four phone calls from the city of New Haven Fire Dispatch reporting that a live wire was down, PURA wrote.
In one instance, dispatch called requesting an ETA of the LRL, and noting that they could not get to the “patient,” according to the report.
UI says that its dispatcher “did not hear the information about the patient due to crosstalk” and that “because this information was not repeated during the remainder of the call and in subsequent calls from … Fire Dispatch,” it did not learn of the presence of a patient until 5:53 p.m. when UI’s LRL called the ECC to inform them that there was a person on the ground, the PURA report states..
“During the third call placed at 5:30 p.m., the (New Haven) Fire Dispatch asked if it was possible to cut off the electricity remotely for the location,” and UI “let them know that to cut electricity remotely for that location, UI would have to drop the whole circuit, which would create an outage for ‘thousands of customers.’” and UI “confirmed that it would drop the circuit upon request by the fire chief,” which was not done on that call, the report states.
The line restoration leader arrived at the location where electrical cutouts were located at about 5:46 p.m.; at 5:49 p.m., the LRL “called the ECC to inform them that he found two cutouts open, and that he opened the third electrical cutout to de-energize the location.”
The LRL went to the location of the wires down and the scene of the accident, tested “the wire on the ground, found it to be de-energized and then went back to … ground the primary so the emergency personnel could safely attend to Mr. Marcatoma.”
Regarding the injured person, the line restoration leader “asked if the ECC had been informed of this, and the ECC operator explained that no one had mentioned to him at any point that there was an injured person,” the report states,
Among other elements, PURA notes in the report are that the LRL’s arrival on scene “was unnecessarily delayed due to a simple, but avoidable mistake” and that UI does “not permanently assign trucks to individuals, so when a LRL is assigned to a response call, the individual must load the truck with PPE and other equipment necessary for the response.”
In this case, the LRL had to return to retrieve PPE and this delayed arrival to the scene by about 24 minutes, the report states. “A delay of 24 minutes during emergency response is substantial. In this case, CoNH (NewHaven) Fire Dispatch arrived at the scene and reported to UI the existence of downed wires at 5:23 p.m. and the need to access a patient at 5:28 p.m.”
The authority report says it “understands that individual employees can make mistakes. However, because it is standard practice that LRLs must gather and load equipment prior to departing to respond to emergency calls effectively and safely, this type of mistake can and should be avoided. UI did not provide evidence in the record to indicate how the Company prepares its employees to avoid such mistakes.”
PURA also noted that, when UI did its emergency stand down meeting for its employees after the incident, there was “no reminder of fundamental response activities, for instance remembering to gather and load equipment before departure,” though the purpose of the meeting “is to relay safety information about the incident as quickly as possible to employees,” according to the report.
“UI stated that, following the Stand Down, it continued its investigation and identified ‘the process issues related to … PPE’ and addressed these with “the line department and ECC personnel,” the PURA report states.
However, UI provided “no additional information describing the content of the communications with its personnel. Because the Company provided no specific information to the Authority about the follow-up done with employees, the Authority cannot evaluate how UI has addressed the issue.”
The PURA reports also notes that UI said it “was unaware at first that there was an immediate, life-threatening situation due to “crosstalk,” however, the “reason that UI ECC personnel were unaware of the patient was because the UI dispatcher did not listen to the report provided by the (New Haven) Fire Dispatch.
“Instead of receiving the report, the ECC operator spoke over the (New Haven) Fire Dispatch personnel. … This is not crosstalk; it is a failure to properly receive the information being reported in an emergency call,” the PURA report states.
“A subsequent call between ECC dispatch and the LRL showed the ECC personnel dismissing the urgency of the situation, questioning why (New Haven) Fire Dispatch considered remotely de-energizing. However, despite the ECC operator’s failure to hear the FD personnel mention that they could not get to a patient, the ECC operator did not follow up and ask the FD personnel why they were requesting remote de-energization. Had this been done, or if the ECC operator had asked if anyone was in danger as a general screening question, the ‘crosstalk’ would not have been an issue,” the PURA report states.
PURA said it recommends it should be standard protocol that when the ECC receives a report of downed wires on an emergency dispatch line, that the ECC operator confirms whether there is any immediate threat to life or public safety.
“While there is no evidence that the LRL or ECC operator’s actions here impacted the accident itself, UI should take steps to make sure proper protocols are in place to ensure rapid response time and ECC awareness of threats to public safety. Such measures could be the difference between life and death,” PURA wrote. “Most troubling is that there is little information about how UI management identified these actions as flawed and how the Company followed up with the individual about how to properly receive and respond to emergency calls.”
In its orders, PURA said that, no later than Feb. 11, 2026, UI “shall provide a summary of the lessons learned about the emergency communications and PPE process issues via compliance filing in Docket No. 25-09-02. The Company shall include in the summary a description of what information was shared with personnel, the date the information was shared, and copies of any written materials shared with employees,” and that by that same date, must document its process post Safety Stand Down to relay updated facts of accidents and updated lessons learned or areas for improvement and submit it to the Authority.